Executive Summary

Djibouti, a nation strategically pivotal in the Horn of Africa, faces one of its most complex and opaque political junctures since independence. Behind a veneer of relative stability in a volatile region, a deep-seated succession crisis threatens to plunge the country into a constitutional vacuum or internal conflict. This analysis, based on informed sources, reveals that President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s pursuit of a sixth term is not merely a desire to cling to power, but an unavoidable outcome of a three-year failure to secure a consensual successor from within his own clan. While a swift constitutional amendment to lift age limits is underway, precise information regarding the President’s critical health condition suggests the situation is far more intricate, with a precarious “Plan B” being crafted to ensure a controlled transfer of power—all against a backdrop of rekindled security threats in the north.

1. The Constitutional Crisis: A Cover for Failed Consensus

After multiple previous statements affirming his non-intention to seek re-election, President Guelleh is now poised for a sixth term. This move necessitates overcoming a fundamental constitutional hurdle; while a previous amendment removed term limits, it retained a clause prohibiting individuals over 75 years of age from running for president. As President Guelleh has surpassed this age, a constitutional amendment to abolish this specific article has become imperative.

According to our sources, the party congress is scheduled for October 25, followed by the official announcement of his candidacy on October 26. However, this apparent clinging to power is not, our sources indicate, the President’s primary choice. Our information reveals that the President has spent the last three years in intensive, closed-door meetings with his own clan (the Mamassan, a sub-clan of the Issa) to agree upon a successor, but all these efforts have failed. The division within the “Mamassan” is acute, with each faction demanding that the next candidate hail from their ranks, threatening to fracture the ruling clan itself.

2. Ethnic and Tribal Fault Lines

The President’s failure to unite his clan is merely one piece of a deeply polarized political landscape:

• Issa-Issa Divide: Other clans constituting the Issa tribe (beyond the Mamassan) categorically reject the continuation of a Mamassan presidency. Conversely, the Mamassan clan considers the nomination of any figure from other Issa clans a “red line,” fearing potential retaliatory acts stemming from past “killings,” according to information circulating among sources.

• Issa-Afar Polarization: The Afar tribes, who represent the majority population in the regions outside the capital, unequivocally oppose the continued dominance of the Issa tribe (in all its factions) over the presidency. Lacking sufficient influence within the military, which is controlled by pro-regime tribal structures, the Afar are increasingly leaning towards armed struggle as their only viable option.

3. Renewed Security Threat in the North

This ethnic polarization directly fuels the evolving security situation in the northern part of the country. Despite the capital’s relative stability, the “Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy” (FRUD), specifically the faction led by Mohamed Kadamy, who rejected previous reconciliation efforts without guarantees, remains active.

Over the past two years, FRUD has intensified its military operations, conducting dozens of attacks that included seizing military camps and kidnapping officers and officials, the most recent instance occurring four months ago. In a significant development, “African Horn Policy Watch” has obtained a recent recording (attached to this report) from a FRUD commander, in which he threatens the government with a “sweeping torrent from the Afar sons” and asserts that “Djibouti, especially the Afar, will not accept a successor to Ismaïl in power.”

4. “Plan B”: Health Crisis and Upcoming Constitutional Maneuvers

The most sensitive and influential factor in this scenario is President Guelleh’s health. Sources very close to the family indicate that the President suffers from multiple ailments that severely impair his actual ability to govern for a full new term, even if he were to run and win:

• Physical Ailments: The President suffers from morbid obesity, accompanied by chronic high blood pressure and heart disease. He also has a severe knee condition, in addition to excruciating and chronic stomach pain (a highly confidential illness not disclosed even to closest relatives), which reportedly requires him to take “morphine twice daily” for pain relief.

• Psychological and Neurological Symptoms (according to a family source): Sources report that the President exhibits early symptoms of “Alzheimer’s disease” and temporary memory loss. More critically, he suffers from “severe screaming episodes during sleep” and nocturnal “dangerous delusions” involving “dead people tormenting him.” A specialized psychiatrist visited him at his daughter’s residence in Paris earlier this year, deliberately outside official records.

This critical health situation explains, according to insiders, the “Plan B” currently being formulated:

1. Candidacy and Victory: The Constitution is amended (age clause), President Guelleh runs, and wins a sixth term to maintain control over the transition process.

2. Early Resignation: After a short period, citing health reasons, the President “resigns” from his post.

3. Constitutional Vacuum: Under the current constitution, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court temporarily assumes the presidency (for 50 days). However, the current Chief Justice (a Somali from the Darod clans) is seen as close to the First Lady, who is reportedly orchestrating her own succession arrangements (for her son or loyalists) and is in deep conflict with the President’s clan (Mamassan).

4. Second Constitutional Maneuver: To circumvent this scenario, it is believed that another constitutional amendment will be pushed through (either now or immediately after the elections) to transfer the interim presidential powers from the Chief Justice to the Speaker of Parliament.

5. Interim Successor (The Enabler): The current Speaker of Parliament is Mr. Dileita Mohamed Dileita (Afar), a personal friend and implicitly trusted confidant of President Guelleh. Dileita will assume the interim presidency.

6. The Ultimate Goal: Dileita will act as an “enabler” to manage the transitional period and ensure the candidacy and victory of President Guelleh’s preferred successor, his nephew, Mr. Jama Idrees Guelleh.

5. International Stance: Strategic Realism Trumps Democracy

Faced with this complex landscape, any Western (American and French) “displeasure” appears more theoretical than practical. Djibouti’s exceptionally strategic importance, hosting major military bases (American, Chinese, French, Japanese), and its role as a partner in counter-terrorism and securing the Bab al-Mandab Strait, leads major powers to prioritize “stability” under Guelleh’s rule over potential “democratic chaos.” Therefore, significant international pressure to prevent these constitutional amendments is unlikely, as long as their vital interests remain protected.

Conclusion

President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh embarks on his final maneuver. He battles not only his political adversaries (the Afar and other Issa clans) but also divisions within his own clan, his declining health, and the ambitions of the First Lady’s inner circle. “Plan B” is a high-stakes gamble dependent on the absolute loyalty of the Speaker of Parliament and the ability to push through complex constitutional amendments in record time. Djibouti is entering a tunnel of uncertainty, which may conclude with a smooth transition of power to the “chosen successor,” or may open the door to internal conflicts fueled by clan rivalries and armed threats.