Executive Summary

The conflict in Sudan has escalated from a domestic power struggle into a full-blown regional and global proxy warseverely undermining the stability of the Horn of Africa. This analysis reveals an accelerating internationalization that transcends the traditional mercenary file (such as Colombian mercenaries and Libyan-based forces loyal to Haftarsupporting the RSF). It highlights the confirmed Eritrean military intervention in support of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the substantial presence of Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fighters as another proxy force.

Current developments suggest that regional interests, particularly the Asmara regime led by Isaias Afwerki, are driven towards sustaining the conflict. Afwerki views any successful mediation effort as potentially bolstering Hemeti’s position, which could subsequently threaten the security of his own regime through possible future support for the Eritrean opposition. Despite internal disagreements within the Eritrean security leadership regarding the rising attrition in Sudan—due to fears of a looming conflict with Ethiopia—Afwerki is pushing for the deployment of more troops, considering Sudanese reconciliation an existential security threat.

2. Analysis Sections: Proxy Warfare and Direct Intervention

2.1. The Mercenary File and Regional Influence Distribution (Eritrean and Haftar Interventions)

The internationalization points to organized and impactful military interventions from multiple parties:

• RSF Mercenaries and External Backers: Reports indicate the presence of foreign mercenaries (Colombians and others) fighting alongside the RSF, reflecting a complex web of financial and military interests.
• Direct Eritrean Intervention (in favor of SAF): Informed sources within the “Horn of Africa Policy Center” indicate the presence of approximately 10,000 Eritrean soldiers fighting alongside the SAF. These forces have actively participated in decisive battles against the RSF, particularly in the fighting in Al Jazirah State, Wad Madani, and Khartoum.
• Tigray Mercenaries as a Proxy Force: Documented intelligence suggests that over 15,000 fighters affiliated with the TPLF (Debretsion wing) are stationed in strategic areas of Eastern Sudan and Sennar. Former TPLF military leaders confirm that these mercenaries have participated in the Sudan war, specifically in the liberation of areas such as Sennar and Al Saneja from RSF control.

2.2. The Eritrean Regime: Strategic Objectives and Internal Disagreements

Isaias Afwerki’s stance reflects strategic volatility driven by regime security calculations:

• Strategic Shift: Afwerki initially sided with Hemeti (pre-war meeting), believing Al-Burhan represented the remnants of the Islamists. However, he quickly reversed course after realizing the loyalty of Eastern Sudan and the Beja tribes to the SAF, which secured the army’s influence on the Eritrean border.
• Playing on Tribal Contradictions: Afwerki’s intelligence continues to play a “dangerous game” to disrupt harmony in Eastern Sudan by supporting conflicting factions from the Hadendawa/Beni Amer tribes, fearing the large extension of Beni Amer inside Eritrea and the possibility of Hemeti supporting them later.
• Eritrean Leadership Disagreements (Attrition and Escalation): Information suggests disputes within the Eritrean security and military leadership regarding the increasing involvement in Sudan. These disputes stem from fears of force depletion, which Asmara might need in an anticipated conflict with Ethiopia. Nevertheless, Afwerki is pushing for more troop deployments, as he views successful Sudanese reconciliation and the retention of power by Hemeti or his allies as a direct, existential security threat to his regime, fearing their support for the Eritrean opposition from Eastern Sudan.

2.3. Regional Escalation and the Red Sea: Internationalizing the Arms File

Asmara has become a pivotal point for foreign intervention:

• Asmara as an Air Hub: Information indicates the landing of more than 12 cargo planes at the Eritrean airports of Asmara and Massawa between late October and early November, loaded with weapons. Sources suggest that Iran is the likely source of these shipments.
• Geopolitical Ramifications: This direct intervention opens the door for counter-interventions from parties hostile to Iran, threatening to turn the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa into an open, long-term proxy conflict arena, jeopardizing navigation and international security.